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Abstract
This article proposes a framework for understanding the way the Chinese 
Rev o lu tion emerged, developed and achieved power (1921-49), then further 
con sol i dat ed in the period of socialist 'uninterrupted revolution' (1949-77) and 
was fi nally abandoned by the post-Mao regime (1977 to the present). This anal-
 y sis is based on a perspective of discourse theories framed in historically new 
forms of political, social and ideological relations. In other words, it attempts to 
con cep tu al ize the transformation of China and the Chinese Communist Party 
by analysing the role of ideological discourses (arguments and interpretations) 
and the cognitive elements (beliefs, goals, desires, expertise, knowledge) as 
the driv ing-force behind societal transformations. The discourse theory ap-
plied here – logocentrism and econocentrism –  also serves both as a political 
arena of strug gle to confer legitimacy on a specifi c socio-political project and 
as a distinctive cog ni tive and evaluative framework for understanding societal 
transformations. The conceptualization of the paper is informed by the work 
of David Apter and Tony Saich on discourse theory.
Introduction
China's attempt to safeguard its existence as a prosperous, strong na tion 
and a united political entity has been the driving force  in recent times. 
The earlier 'attempts' at modernization suffered a series of set backs ema-
nating from both internal and external forces.1 In an attempt to transform 
and reinvigorate their nations, fi rst Russia and then China eventually 
found some answers in Marxist teachings and rev o lu tion ary theories. 
Depending on how one assesses the successes and failures of the Chinese 
Revolution and Maoist socialism, China will be re mem bered for its his-
torically unique experiment to skip over the stage of capitalism as laid 
down within Marxist orthodoxy and to bring about a socialist 'great leap 
forward' not only in its political, economic and so cial structures but also 
in the cultural traditions and consciousness of its people. It achieved this 
in ways that defi ed conventional ideological and political norms in both 
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established capitalist as well as socialist states. With the introduction 
of 'market socialism', China is un der tak ing a mod ern i za tion process by 
embracing capitalist practices, while at the same time integrating itself 
into the existing capitalist world sys tem. 
In the last 50 years of its existence, the People's Republic has wit nessed 
two major social projects which have transformed the nation: 
Firstly, a Maoist China that took a socialist development strategy 
characterized by:
•    co-operative and state (public) ownership and control of the means 
of production and distribution; 
• a highly centralized system of planned economy; mass campaigns 
for the elimination of economic and political inequalities as well 
as class privileges, which were believed to retard economic devel-
opment and prevent the full utilization of human resources and 
potential; and 
•   the dominance of the group interests of the immediate producers 
at the workplace and of working people in all spheres of society, 
including resource allocation and control over politics and ideas. 
Secondly, a Dengist China that is taking the capitalist road of eco-
 nom ic development based on:
•   privatization of ownership and control of the means of production 
and distribution; 
•   marketization of the economy;  enlarging socioeconomic inequities 
and political privileges; 
•   emphasizing science and technology as the essential productive 
forces; and giving priority to the interests of the privileged, profes-
sional and entrepreneur classes.
How can we reconcile this dramatic social and ideological dis con -
ti nu i ty that characterizes China between the two periods? How can we 
explain and interpret this historical transformation, within the frame-
 work of fundamental changes in ideas, beliefs, value systems, and the 
ways of thinking of Chinese people?
Objective and Methodological Consideration
This article proposes a framework for understanding the way the Chi-
 nese Revolution emerged, developed and attained power (1921-49), then 
further consolidated in the socialist continuation period (1949-77) and 
was fi nally abandoned by the post-Mao regime (1977 to the present)(see 
Figure 1). The analysis is based on a perspective of discourse theories
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framed in historically new forms of political, social and ideological rela-
tions. In other words, it is an attempt to conceptualize the transformation 
of China including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by analysing 
the role of ideological discourses (arguments and interpretations) and 
the cog ni tive elements (beliefs, goals, desires, awareness, knowledge) 
as the driv ing-force behind societal transformations. 
Discourse analysis, as used within the context of this paper, is an ap-
proach to study the interrelationships between cognition/con scious ness 
(language, concept, notion and comprehension) and society (pol i tics, 
economics and policies). Since meaning is discourse-dependent, dis-
course analysis sees the construction of language (argument, ex pres sion 
and explanation) as imbued with powerful meanings and sig nifi  cance 
in socio-political contexts. In other words, the foreground of dis course 
analysis implies that language use (terminology, vocabulary and ex-
pression) in social and political context entails essentially a matter of 
'actions', i.e. enacting activities, perspectives and identities, rather than 
just 'constitution' of arguments. After all, discourses are social languages
(Gee 1999) because they are tied to social relations, identities, power, 
inequality, class struggle, etc.
The advantage of such an approach lies in its theoretical, meth od o -
log i cal and analytical usefulness in understanding the effect of dis-
 cours es on the macro-context of historical, social and political prac tic es. 
Discourse analysis here refers to:
modes of argument that are more consistently generalized and speculative 
than normal scientifi c discussion. … Discourse, by contrast, is ratiocinative. 
It focuses on the process of reasoning rather than the results of immediate 
experience, and it becomes signifi cant where there is no plain and evident 
truth. Discourse seeks persuasion through argument rather than prediction. Its 
persuasiveness is based on such qualities as logical coherence, expansiveness 
of scope, interpretive insight, value relevance, rhetorical force, beauty, and 
texture of argument. (Alexander 1988: 80)
Discourse is often expressed in the form of theories, and discourse 
theories are constructed to offer a particular type of explanation to le-
 git i mize certain political and ideological ideas. Discourse theories are 
often established at both epistemological and ontological levels, aim ing 
to defend particular orders of justifi cation in the course of de lib er at ing 
over the appropriateness of a socio-economic system. To be more specifi c, 
discourse analysis is related to the study of important con cepts such as 
identity, confl ict, power, dominance and inequality, and the role of the 
state or state institutions. It denotes a process of societal, cultural and 
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ideological reconstruction or reproduction through 'language used in tan-
dem with actions, interactions, non-linguistic symbol systems, ob jects, 
tools, technologies, and distinctive ways of thinking, valuing, feel ing, 
and believing' (Gee 1999: 11).
Discourse analysis does not attempt to provide a tangible answer or 
solution on the basis of scientifi c research. It promotes the un der stand ing 
of the conditions behind a specifi c 'problem' (confl ict, war, con tra dic tion, 
environment, etc.) and interprets the essence of that 'problem' and its 
resolution. It is expected that the promotion of understanding can lead 
to changes in the practices of an institution or a society as a whole. Dis-
course analysis cannot be categorized either as a qualitative or quantita-
tive research method. Rather, it aims to question the basic assumptions 
of the established research methods. When applied, the reliability and 
validity of one's research depend substantially on the force, logic and 
quality of one's analysis and rhetoric. However, it is also subject to 
counter-interpretation and counter-argument.
Discourse Theories: Econocentrism and Logocentrism
The idea adopted in this article of applying discourse theories and the 
two central models (econocentrism and logocentrism) together with a 
few other concepts, is inspired by David Apter and Tony Saich's book, 
Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic (1994). This book provides a 
new way of understanding the power of political ideas and their im pact 
on the mobilization of political movements. It constructs a unique ap-
proach to the role of political discourse as powerful symbolic capital in 
interpreting the revolutionary process in Mao's China. 
The present article not only seek to apply Apter and Saich's frame work 
of discourse theory and use the two competitive models as an a lyt i cal 
categories, but also to contexualize/exemplify them in com bi na tion with 
my own research on China's development. In other words, this article 
aims at shredding light on how their discourse approach relates in spe-
cifi c ways to the understanding of China's major transformations in the 
last century. Such an endeavour is based on a number of propositions:
1.   The historical transformation of China in its various social, economic 
and political guises takes place against a background of specifi c 
discourses; 
2.   Political discourses have played a vital role in the Chinese 
construction of social, political and cultural meanings and identities 
for a specifi c hegemonic project; 
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3.   The latest transition of China from socialism to capitalism (market 
socialism) can be conceptualized as demonstrating how the previous 
hegemonic discourses become dislocated when new events cannot 
be integrated, represented or domesticated;
4.   The relationship between the two paradigms (logocentrism and 
econocentrism) is a recurrent dialectical process of mutual gen er a tion 
and mutual destruction.
Econocentrism
In its specifi c form, econocentrism refers to a belief that the economic 
mode of production absolutely determines a society's social, political 
and intellectual life. It accepts the primacy of economics as a point of 
departure in the production and reproduction of social life due to hu-
 man 'rationality'. In other words, it is an ideology that views economics 
as the key determinant in the course of human history.
Today, the econocentric worldview dominates every sphere of our 
everyday lives. All theories of rational choice and major theories in pol-
 i tics, sociology, international political economy, international relations, 
and development studies are constructed on the premises of economic 
analysis or within the framework of economic thinking as their pri ma ry 
paradigm of interpretation. Most concepts, which are operated daily, 
such as 'culture', 'ideology', 'nationalism', 'democracy' etc., serve either 
as residuals or supplements to econocentric models. It is gen er al ly ac-
cepted that economic structure in one way or another de ter mines aspects 
of human activities and social relations, and economic dom i nance leads 
to political and ideological leadership.
At the core of the econocentric model is methodological individualism,
in which politics is perceived as a process that 'objectifi es private and 
individual wants and desires in the form of social needs and priorities 
according to distributive schedules and alternative possibilities'; while 
power is associated with rationality – bargaining and compromising 
forms of politics in which interests often prevail over principles and 
negotiations over confrontations (Apter and Saich 1994: 3-4).
If one applies the above to the present era of Chinese econocentrism, it 
is not diffi cult to see that the notion of 'socialism' has been re inter pret ed 
by the incorporation of the market as an inseparable element of the 
socialist economy. Socialism, according to the reformist un der stand ing, 
'can only appeal to the people with the basic goal of enriching the country 
and its people, not yet the higher goals of social equality and the full 
development of the person' (Ogden 1996: 656). The meaning of socialist 
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development has been redefi ned in the language of an un com pro mis ing 
economist and its goal is 'to achieve a "pragmatic" ad just ment of revolu-
tion to the demands of present reality' (Dirlik 1989: 32).
Logocentrism
The word logo originates from the Greek, meaning 'word' or 'speech'. 
In its general form, logo is short for logogram and logotype, which 
refers to 'a name, symbol, or trademark designed for easy and defi nite 
rec og ni tion'.2
Logocentrism, philosophically, is a concept used in critical theory to 
designate how thought systems are organized around fundamental as-
 sump tions about reality and truth. It was a key concept in the thinking 
of Jacques Derrida and of deconstruction theory.3 Logocentrism argues 
that language, in terms of explanations and interpretations, is com posed 
of elements of linguistic signs, which are accorded with meaning and 
signifi cations (logos and symbols). Since language and texts are always 
tied to experience, the use of language contains perception, conceptu-
alization, power and position.
Politically, logocentrism aims to display an alternative worldview 
and a new interpretation of truth and reality. It is explicit in its objective 
to reconstruct the world through strategies of cognitive awareness and 
critical thinking at both ontological and epistemological levels leading 
to political mobilization and struggle. These strategies contain a proc-
 ess of searching for alternative perspectives, for what can be brought to 
light, for what can be signifi ed, and for the narrative structure of new 
explanations. Narratives can become the new totalizing logos, which, 
in return, gather multiple narratives for practical purposes. It is per haps 
precisely according to the above interpretation that Mao, in a sim i lar way 
to Gramsci, assigned a more pivotal importance to conscious activity 
than did Marx (Dirlik 2003).
Hence, political power can be generated through logo (language and 
symbol), i.e. through both power behind discourse and power in dis-
 course. The logocentric mode of power 'is concerned less with choices 
than with projections made on the basis of some doctrinal defi nition 
of necessity that specifi es its own rules and theoretical principles and 
for which it provides its own logic' (Apter and Saich 1994: 4, emphasis 
add ed). Its central goal is to re-establish social order based on a re de fi ned 
and projected justice and equity. It looks into the conscious part of hu-
man life and emphasizes learning and education as the key to power, 
and knowledge and wisdom as a form of truth. Logocentric power is 
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identifi ed as possessing proto-religious characteristics in ter twined in a 
secular theory of politics (ibid.: 3) 
The logocentric power based on political discourse and symbolic cap-
 i tal is able to unleash potential energy to create a political community 
under conditions of virtual chaos and disintegration. The construction 
of alternative discourses can transcend randomness and create a logic 
of order so that the condition of disorder itself becomes the condi-
tion of transition and even transformation. Logocentrism cultivates 
a com mon interpretation of shared history and experiences. To join 
in a rev o lu tion ary movement implies 'to think one's way past current 
pre dic a ments and arrive at fresh, new solutions at once comprehensive 
and radical, most importantly, in concert with others'. Such a movement 
must be 'one that has at its disposal its own language, discourse, myths 
and log ic' (ibid.: 8, emphasis added). Armed with the deployment of 
its own cat e go ries, logocentrism attempts to resolve the contradictions 
of his tor i cal legacy in its own favour in order to pave the way for great 
eco nom ic, social and cultural transformations.
Logocentrism and the Chinese Revolution4
The dynamic strength of logocentrism in the context of the Chinese rev o -
lu tion lies in its effort to generate power through an inversive dis course, 
i.e. inversing the econocentric paradigm and social order, based on its 
own language of conviction together with ideological, ethnic, linguistic 
strands. The historical role of the Chinese logocentrism can be analysed 
via four propositions, as set out below.
1.  To change people's worldview through a reinterpretation of history 
and narrative reconstruction of reality in order to think one's way out 
of current predicaments.
Logocentric Maoism (as mentioned, a form of sinifi ed Marxism em-
 pha siz ing the role of conscious awareness) related China's un der de -
vel op ment to the outcome of a historical process caused by the Western 
colonial-imperialist expansion rather than to the 'stage of de vel op ment' 
defi ned by the modernization school or to the consequences of a spe cifi c 
mode of production in connection with cultural barriers.5 From this 
per spec tive, underdevelopment was not an inborn characteristic of pre-
in dus tri al societies but a consequence of a specifi c historical proc ess. 
After numerous failures of resistance to Western imperialist chal leng es 
since the Sino-British Opium War in the 1840s, Confucianism as a state 
ideology and as an enduring vehicle for ethical and political traditions, 
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fi nally lost its viability at a time when China urgently needed a new 
analytical framework to understand its fall. Some analytical categories 
and aspects of Marxism, and especially Lenin's theory of capitalist 
im pe ri al ism, provided Chinese intellectuals with a partial theoretical 
frame work as well as a psychological answer to help explain the failures 
of traditional Chinese culture and the humiliation suffered at the hands 
of the West (Peck 1975: 73).
Thus, when Confucianism failed to function satisfactorily as a state 
ideology, many Chinese revolutionary intellectuals turned to Marx-
ism-Leninism as a way of reconceptualizing the world from different 
on to log i cal perspectives embedded with concepts that were alien to 
the Chinese society of the time. China, as they saw it, was no longer 
an isolated centre of the globe surrounded by barbarians, but a con-
stituent part of the world replete with different forces and ideas. They 
reconceptualized China's role in international affairs from being at the 
center of the world and a universal authority to recognizing China's 
problems as sharing in the world's problems.6 From this perspective, 
the struggle of Chinese people, and the radical revolutions that were 
taking place all over the country, could not be detached from the out side 
world. The attraction of Marxism-Leninism for the Chinese was that, 
as Kapur observed:
(a) […] It was an effective ploy to criticize the West from a Western point 
of view; (b) it gave the Chinese a new methodological framework to 
understand their own past and foresee the contours of their future; (c) it 
offered a conceptualized view of international reality. Lastly, it amply proved 
its anti-imperialist credentials – an important source of attraction – after the 
1917 Bolshevik Revolution when the Soviet leaders denounced imperialism, 
unilaterally abolishing unequal treaties and relinquishing many privileges 
of tsarist Russia including extraterritoriality as well as their share of Boxer 
indemnities. (Kapur 1987: 3)
2.  To unite people based on collective individualism and a social, 
political and economic divide.
Logocentric Maoism persuaded people to link their private narratives 
and personal interpretations to that of the collectivity. It called for in-
 di vid u al contribution but with collective outcomes. Such a strategy 
aimed to analyse Chinese society through the lens of a sociocultural 
and eco nom ic divide (class division), and to relate this divide to the 
su per struc ture of society. In a society where people are divided into 
different class es, all men possess certain class interests and relations. 
All realms of human relations, such as values, rights, dignity, liberty, 
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freedom, love and hatred, humanity and inhumanity, etc., can only be 
understood and explained through concrete historical and class analy-
sis (Chen 1984: 41-44). Logocentric Maoism persuaded people to think 
that all political confl icts could be comprehended in terms of the divide. 
The purpose of generating societal transformation is reached when the 
majority of members of all social strata interpret politics and participate 
in the strug gle in terms of this divide.
Both the failure of Sun Yat-sen's Republic Revolution (which was 
in spired by Western constitutional monarchy and republicanism) and 
the rise of Japan, assisted by its militarist culture, led China's early rev-
 o lu tion ary pioneers to conclude that neither the West nor Japan could 
be emulated as alternatives to save and develop China. The question 
then arose: what other development options might suit the particular 
con di tions and needs of the Chinese nation? Early Marxists like Li 
Dazhao and Chen Duxiu argued that with or without a strong state, 
the es tab lish ment of Chinese capitalism would eventually become the 
agent of Western capitalism and that this would fail to solve the prob-
lems of poverty and backwardness in China. The most forceful and 
com pre hen sive arguments were put forward by Li Dazhao:
[A]lthough China itself has not yet undergone a process of capitalist economic 
development such as occurred in Europe, America, and Japan, the common 
people [of China] still indirectly suffer from capitalist economic oppression 
in a way that is even more bitter than the direct capitalist oppression suffered 
by the working class of the various (capitalist) nations[…]
   If we look again at the international position of China today, [we see] that 
other nations have already passed from free competition to the necessary 
socialist-cooperative position, while we are still juveniles; others have 
walked a thousand li, while we are still taking the fi rst step[…] I fear that 
we will be unable to succeed unless we take double steps and unite into a 
socially cooperative organization. Therefore, if we want to develop industry 
in China, we must organize a government made up purely of producers in 
order to eliminate the exploiting classes within the country, to resist world 
capitalism, and to follow [the path of] industrialization organized upon a 
socialist basis. (Li in Kung, 1975: 259)
Li's argument identifi ed China as a 'proletarian nation', although it 
lacked a strong industrial working class. He likened the potential of a 
Chinese proletarian revolution to the worldwide movements against 
international capitalism and imperialism. His far-reaching and in sight ful 
analytical worldview paved the way for the establishment of a pop u list 
tradition within the Chinese Communist Party, which was further de-
veloped by his disciple, Mao Zedong.
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Armed by an inversive discourse based on the conceptual power of 
class divisions, the CCP aimed at transforming the Chinese people from 
being like 'a sheet of blank paper'7 to becoming ideologically and po lit i-
 cal ly conscious. By becoming members of this inversive revolution, the 
Chinese would begin to see themselves as decision-makers, as agents 
of social transformation, as masters of their own destiny, rather than as 
passive victims, bending to the will of their political masters.
3.  To project a future based on structural transformation rather than 
evolutionary modifi cations.
The immediate context of Maoist logocentrism was confl ict and cha os, 
war and revolution – not reformism or evolutionism. Logocentrism 
re ject ed the current reality or truth, in favour of a projected structural 
transformation yet to be realized. It attempted to constitute a new he-
gemonic project – a moral economy, not a political economy – that was 
inversive in object and transformational in consequence. 
Some scholars argue that even though imperialist penetration did bring 
elements of modernity to China, the impact was geographically confi ned 
and sectorally skewed to serve foreign interest (Esherick in White 1982: 
114). The reason why China was able to industrialize more rapidly after 
1949 was that the 'Communist revolution decisively broke the ties that 
chained China to the imperialist system' (Mould in White 1982: 114). In 
other words, China went straight to the roots of its his tor i cal problems 
and made radical structural transformations – unique ex per i ments to skip 
over the stage of capitalism and to bring about a so cial ist transformation 
in terms of both society and the consciousness of its peo ple.
4.  To continue the logocentric tradition and bring 'uninterrupted 
revolution' into the socialist project.
After the communist victory of 1949 and with the successful de vel -
op ment of the socialist economy and transformation in the early 1950s, 
few people in the communist leadership thought of a continuous 
rev o lu tion in terms of a prolonged period of struggle. Revolution was 
main ly regarded as the act of seizing power, whereas the building of a 
new economy and social order would require a different methodology. 
Nev er the less the next three decades witnessed the continuation of the 
Chi nese revolution through a progression of several mass movements, 
such as the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s, the Anti-rightist Movement 
and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Mao's the o ry 
of uninterrupted revolution was practised during these experiences based 
on the conviction that even under socialist development, the rev o lu tion 
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must continue. Among those experiments, the Cultural Rev o lu tion was 
perhaps the most dramatic example of a nation in search of a strategy that 
would avoid a return to the 'old' paradigm to resolve so cial ist contradic-
tions and to continue an independent self-reliance path (Li 2001).
The meaning of 'uninterrupted revolution' should be understood as 
referring to the preservation of some important logocentric con ti nu i ties 
in Mao's thoughts and practices, as Selden summarizes:
They include the fi erce commitment to eliminate exploitation and property-
based inequality; the emphasis on political mobilization, class struggle, and 
political and ideological transformation and their relationship to economic 
development; the proclivity to replace the market and the household 
economy by large cooperative, collective, and state institution; and the 
emphasis on self-reliance and the suspicion of intellectuals and technical 
personnel. (Selden 1989: 54-55)
In Mao's view, the theoretical and ideological basis for continuous 
rev o lu tion during a peaceful development period was very important. 
He believed that an uninterrupted revolution was an objective necessity 
refl ecting both the material conditions of China and the Chinese peo ple's 
desire and aspiration for social change. He explained that:
China's 600 million people have two peculiarities: They are fi rst of all poor, 
and secondly, blank. This may seem like a bad thing, but it is really a good 
thing. Poor people want change, want to do things, want revolution. A clear 
sheet of paper has no blotches and so the newest and most beautiful words 
can be written on it. (Mao in Kung 1975: 292)
Poverty and blankness was seen by Mao as political capital – a driv ing 
force not only for revolution to transform China but also for eco nom ic 
development to build a strong and prosperous socialist state. This view 
was built on his observation and conceptualization of hu man beings as the 
most valuable social capital: 'of all the things in the world, people are the 
most precious. As long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be 
performed under the leadership of the Com mu nist Party' (Mao in Eckstein 
1977: 33). The political and ideological nex us is clearly recognized:
In man, the producer, motivation derives from consciousness, which in turn 
comes from social practice. Motivation is the source of moral energies, such as 
dedication, devotion, determination, faith, frugality, industry, and simplicity. 
Consciousness and motivation reinforce each other, and can be transformed 
into material force through man's labour. (Kung 1975: 292-93)
This is a completely different world outlook from that of market eco-
 nom ic theories, which highlight the market mechanism and individual 
profi t-seeking as an invisible hand directing economic development. 
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That Mao seemingly politicized the question of socialist construction 
was due not to his intention to challenge the economic rationality, but 
to his attempt to use politics to mobilize human resources and all social 
forces in the service of economic development. In other words, it was an 
endeavour to transform symbolic capital into economic capital.
In order to fully utilize human beings as an effective instrument in 
the socialist project, Mao sought to establish a worldview in which the 
part is seen in relation to the whole. Specifi cally, this worldview aimed 
at broadening the concept of the 'whole' – which had been narrowed 
to imply loyalty to one's family, village and clan – to the consciousness 
of the class, the nation and beyond. The goal was to form in society 
a Gong-outlook in contrast to the Si-oriented one. These two Chinese 
words have strong logo connotations, with the former expressing col-
lectivity, solidarity and public orientation, and the latter referring to 
selfi shness, individualism and ego-outlook. The socialist wage policy, 
which at tempt ed to bridge income differences at that time, refl ected such 
in cen tives. In the industrial sector, wage differentials were either stabi-
lized or reduced, whereas in the people's communes, income through 
alloting working points was based not only on the individual's material 
con tri bu tion to total production, but also on the level of his/her political 
con scious ness and socialist devotion.
Econocentrism and 'Market Socialism'
The period from the 1980s to the present is the great age of econocen-
trism and pragmatism in the history of China. It also marks a signifi cant 
par a digm shift in which the econocentric discourse has become the 
engine to transform the state and society. The 15th Communist Party 
Congress enshrined Deng Xiaoping Theory in the Chinese Communist 
Party Con sti tu tion alongside Mao Zedong Thought. The core ideological 
dis cours es underlining the Dengist reform practices can be summarized 
as follows: 
•     China's industrialization program should proceed beyond the as-
sumption of a socialism-capitalism dichotomy as illustrated by Deng's 
'Cat Theory'. That is to say, in relation to its modernization project, 
China must be open to all theories and practices regardless of their 
socialist or capitalist nature or origin. 
•     Practice (pragmatism and wealth) is the sole criterion of measuring 
the truth of any theory or thought. In other words, any idea and 
strategy that can bring about a satisfactory result of capital accumu-
lation will be considered useful and reliable. By this token, socialism 
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must be fl exible in the practical context of the world system. In this 
sense, pragmatism will lead to truth and power. 
•     The modernization process should take into consideration China's 
particular situation and needs, i.e. 'building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics'. This rejects the idea that Chinese socialism has been 
theoretically completed and practically established; and China's 
present socialism will continue to be open to all sorts of experiments 
in the manner of 'crossing the river by touching the stone'.8 
•     Instead of viewing people as the essential element of production, 
Dengist thought shares with market economism the conviction that 
science and technology are the prime productive forces; and it sees 
the market as being a catalytic force and as ideologically neutral.
However, while the fundamental principle of the entire reform proc-
 ess is no doubt econocentric, the reform theorists and designers also 
understand the discourse power attached to logocentrism. In an effort 
to promote capitalism without cognitive disconnection from socialism, 
they have struggled to construct an awkward mix combining social-
ist logo (the socialist identity) on the one hand and capitalist market 
forces on the other. Such a mixture is clearly refl ected in the many new 
terms invented for theoretical fi nesse and ideological justifi cation, 
such as 'so cial ist market economy' or 'market economy with Chinese 
char ac ter is tics', and 'Confucian businessman', which are politically and 
eco nom i cal ly self-contradictory. 
However, behind the 'Chinese characteristics', we are presented with 
the logocentric ingredients of 'adherence to the primacy of socialism', 
'supremacy of the leadership of the Communist Party', 'adaptation of 
Marxist principles to the conditions of China', etc. The purpose of stick-
 ing to these logocentric tenets is to generate a similar transformative ef-
fect but no longer for revolution and socialism. Rather, they are in tend ed 
to rationalize and legitimize the econocentric reform practices. The le-
gitimizing process consists of a series of theoretical articulations geared 
towards a new interpretation of the truth and reality as follows:
The 'Cat Theory'
The key logic of Deng's 'Cat Theory' ('it doesn't matter whether the cat 
is white or black as long as it can catch the mouse') is that if capitalism 
can produce positive results, then it is good for socialism too. It is an 
expression of metaphysical and mechanical materialism that is based 
on highly pragmatic and practical assumptions. It seeks to reinterpret 
the relationship between productive forces and production relations 
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so as to establish that the basic determinant of human history is not 
pol i tics or class struggle, but economics, especially the development of 
the productive forces of society.
According to this theory, the criteria for judging socialism and cap i -
tal ism should be whether it is benefi cial to productivity development, 
enhancing the overall national economic strength, and improving the 
people's living standards. If anything is benefi cial in these senses, then it 
can be considered socialist. Its fl aw lies in the fact that it rates pro duc tive 
forces much more highly than production relations. Seen from the basic 
principles of socialist production relations, and taking account of China's 
market reform in the past two decades, this ideological par a digm rep-
resents a historical 'great leap backwards' since the new socio-economic 
system is established by developing the productive forces but at the cost 
of dismantling the socialist production relations.
'Socialist Primary Stage'9 and 'Science and Technology as 
the Prime Productive Forces'
Closely related to the Cat Theory, another theoretical argument in 
sup port of the reform program seeks to redefi ne the conceptual un der -
stand ing of 'Chinese socialism'. One of China's key reformist intellectu-
als, Su Shaozhi, claimed that China 'is still in a transition period from 
pre-so cial ist to socialist society, still catching up with the missed lessons 
of capitalism' (Su 1983: 175). Accordingly, it is now argued that given 
the level of the productive forces in post-revolution China, the failure of 
socialism is due to the rapidity of the transition to 'full' socialist re la tions 
of production. This 'Marxist' interpretation of China's de vel op ment lays 
the foundation for the theoretical justifi cation of reform pol i cies: namely, 
that China could not take the socialist road without going through the 
stage of fully developed capitalism (Su 1990). 
The reformist elites argue that according to Marx, socialism and 
com mu nism must originate from mature capitalism, but unfortunately 
Chi nese socialism did not emerge from the womb of highly developed 
cap i tal ist society but from a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Even 
though during the socialist transition period, China had undergone 
lengthy and profound transformations in the realm of social relations 
and relations of production, yet this still could not free it from the relics 
of the old society. Based on this type of interpretation, it is maintained 
that 'history has decided that many conditions that in a general historic 
view must be prepared in the capitalist stage must continue to be fully 
prepared by us in the course of building socialism' (Lu 1983: 22). 
80  The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 18•2003
Li Xing
Historically, however, social transformation is not necessarily de-
 ter mined by the level of economic development, but by the seizure of 
po lit i cal power by a class or classes committed to and capable of gen er -
at ing structural changes: the Industrial Revolution in the West and the 
fi rst socialist revolution in Russia and China were achieved following 
the seizure of political power by a committed class (Selden 1979: 21). 
In this sense, the success of revolution and transformation depends 
fi rst and foremost on achieving political power. Politics is the social 
en gi neer ing of coercion, rationalization, legitimization and imposition 
in volv ing enforced variation, reshaping, selection and distortion.
Therefore, the emphasis on the promotion of the productive forces 
needs critical rethinking. On the one hand, the establishment of new 
socialist production relations, based on the econocentric view, does 
not necessarily bring about the advance of productive forces because 
the material-centred profi t incentive cannot be avoided in stimulating 
eco nom ic activities. Accordingly, if the development of the productive 
forc es is set as a precondition, then the market mechanisms will have 
to be incorporated. On the other hand, the situation in China today 
reconfi rms the logocentric interpretation of the truth and reality: the 
introduction of market functions eventually leads to inequalities and 
polarization, which endangers the establishment of socialist production 
relations. The present situation of polarization between the working 
class and the propertied class is more akin to the 'primitive stage of 
capitalism' than to any stage of socialism.
'Middle-Class Stability' ('Let Some Become Rich First')
'Class' has been a political concept and a socio-economic category since 
the time of Marxism's introduction into China's modern revolutionary 
history. It played a vital role in the post-revolutionary period.10 Before 
the economic reform, 'class' was generally defi ned in terms of political, 
family and occupational criteria that were used to mobilize mass par tic i-
 pa tion both for political movement and for economic development. 
Since the 1980s the CCP declared the end of class struggle and has 
since gradually banished class discourse from the offi cial ideology in 
dealing with domestic and international affairs. This de-class prop o -
si tion is claimed to be based on the present reality that 'The system of 
exploitation of man by man has been eliminated, and exploiters no long er 
exist as classes' and 'with the abolition of the exploiting system and the 
disappearance of the exploiting classes, they [exploiting class es] have 
lost the political and economic basis to exert power; they are scat tered, 
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unstable and their numbers and scope of activity are greatly lim it ed' 
(Beijing Review 44, 1981). However, ironically, it is actually during this 
reform period that we are seeing the emergence of a real class society.
In order to unleash the productive forces, it is necessary for the re-
 form ists to transfer certain power from the political bureaucracy to those 
with technical and professional expertise (from 'red' to 'expertise').11
Behind this power transfer there lies the political discourse in which 
science and technology are elevated to become the prime productive 
forces; and where the objective of market socialism is to create a new 
technocratic-managerial class as the leading productive force for mod-
 ern i za tion. This new class consists of the same people who were the 
'red bourgeoisie' (in terms of nepotism and privileges, not necessarily 
in terms of wealth and production relations) during the Cultural Rev o -
lu tion. Today they are becoming the real bourgeoisie as a result of the 
current marketization process and through the new production re la tions 
that make privatization possible.
The reformist intellectuals who favour the development of cap i tal ism 
base their arguments on the theory of 'middle-class stability'. Tak ing 
the advanced Western capitalist societies as its point of departure, this 
theory claims that these societies are much more homogeneous 'be cause 
of the presence of a large middle class (40 percent of the total population) 
which acts as a social stabilizer, and the richest and poorest constitute 
only a very small proportion of the overall population'; and 'when most 
people's living conditions are considered to be at a middle level, the 
social structure is stable' (Li 1997: 48). Thus, it is assumed that a phase 
of capitalist development is necessary to accelerate the con struc tion of 
the material base essential for developing socialism in the future, and to 
reinforce state power and raise the living standards of its people. Such 
an assumption is built on the belief that despite the cap i tal ist mode of 
functioning, the objectives of socialism, nationalism and common well-
being will be served eventually.
Paradoxically, the new Chinese wealthy class is largely generated 
from within the ranks of the Communist Party. It is politically depend-
ent on the Party and economically tied to the 'de-socialist' free market. 
The current situation in China is running counter to the theories of the 
re form ists. Ironically, many of today's contradictions in China's market 
socialism are those of class struggle. Class divisions and struggles at lo-
cal, regional as well as national level will become the key socio-po lit i cal 
problems affecting China's industrialization in the near and me di um 
term. This is due to the refusal to dialectically understand the true tenet 
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that the means and ends of capitalism are not easily separated. Indeed, 
the more economically successful methods of capitalism are utilized, the 
less socialist ends will be possible (Meisner 1997: 269; Weil 1996). 
'Three Represents'
The 'Three Represents' is part of the ideological reconstruction of the 
CCP in the current critical period of dramatic societal transformations. 
Again, it is part of the CCP's ongoing attempt to legitimize China's 
econocentric 'market socialism' through injecting logocentric capital for 
the purpose of ideological and theoretical justifi cation.
It was said that the 'Three Represents' was fi rst formulated by the 
former President Jiang Zemin. It refers to the three areas which the CCP 
represents: (i) the requirement to develop advanced productive forces, 
(ii) an orientation towards advanced culture, and (iii) the fundamental 
interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China. Al though 
it is an awkwardly named theory approved by the Communist Party 
Congress, it refl ects the fact that there is a continuous need for the o ret i cal 
and ideological justifi cations at the state and party levels to take account 
of the political, economic and social transformations brought about by 
the rapid economic development. 'Advanced productive forc es' (the new 
business elite), 'advanced culture' (Confucian culture of social harmony 
and respect of authority and social order) and 'fundamental interests' 
(the new social constituencies) are strong discourses (logos) aiming to 
legitimize the consequences generated by the econocentric reform poli-
cies and to reinterpret a number of transformed relations (party, state, 
private economy, class, civil society, cultural changes, etc.).
Among the transformations, the change in class relations, such as the 
increased role of private entrepreneurs in China's economy in creat-
ing new jobs and wealth, is perhaps one of the most important factors 
be hind the 'Three Represents'. The Chinese Constitution theoretically 
de fi nes the working class as the key socio-political component in control 
of society and the work unit. However, industrial labour today has in 
reality been turned by the economic marketization into a commodity 
'owned', or at least controlled, by party elites, private business groups 
and multinational corporations. The state is increasingly willing to sac-
 ri fi ce labour welfare and social stability in exchange for a rapid in crease 
in productivity (Li 1999).
The marketization of the economy has brought about the trans for -
ma tion of social/class relations in a number of areas. First, it makes 
economic calculations the priority of Guanxi, promoting economic 
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an tag o nism and precluding solidarity.12 Second, it absorbs people's de-
 vo tion, energy, capacity and resources, and confi nes them within a nar-
 row framework of economism. Third, it hides production/class re la tions 
and separates them from the market relations so that the ex ploi ta tion or 
unequal social/class relations in production are ignored while the equal
relationship in market competitions is emphasized.
Today with the increase in the privatization process, the economic 
power of China's new bourgeoisie (middle class) is also growing.13 The 
situation is very ironic: the new capitalists today are much stronger and 
wealthier than they were before the socialist transformation in 1953. 
To protect their interests, they have raised the demand for political 
rec og ni tion and governing power. Besides creating their own types of 
as so ci a tions, a large number of private capitalists have already entered 
the People's Congresses and People's Political Consultative Conferences 
at different levels (Chen 1999), which will sooner or later transform the 
existing political system and power structure.
Concluding Remarks: the Dialectics between 
Logocentrism and Econocentrism
This article has attempted to explain the contemporary trans for ma tions 
taking place in China by focusing on the importance of discourse the o ry 
– logocentrism and econocentrism - as (i) a political arena of struggle for 
conferring legitimacy on a specifi c sociopolitical project, and (ii) a dis-
tinctive cognitive and evaluative framework for understanding societal 
transformations. This type of approach rests on the particular criteria of 
explanations and interpretations inscribed within the cog ni tive gram-
mars (such as socialism, class, Confucianism). For example, the reformist 
discourse grammar is embedded with strong political gram mars thereby 
serving a theoretical and ideological function of pol i cy rationalization 
and legitimization. From this standpoint, certain sys tems (marketiza-
tion, privatization) and practices (de-welfare, commodifi cation of health 
care, etc.) are vindicated as rational and his tor ic while other practices 
are discredited as irrational or ahistoric. The post-Mao transformation 
explains that political discourses are not only a way of expressing view-
points but also a weapon to legitimize nec es sary changes. 
The failure of the Maoist logocentric socialist project is an interesting 
topic for research if one adopts the perspective of Gramscian political 
theory of hegemony (Li 1998). Socialist hegemony must incorporate 
and adjust to the pre-revolutionary material, social, political and cul-
tural heritage. The logocentric discourses represent a powerful method 
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of an a lys ing and exposing the defects of capitalist society (econocen-
trism). How ev er, it is highly questionable whether solutions to these 
problems and the post-revolutionary contradictions in the domains of 
social re la tions, such as party/state/civil society, class/ideology, and 
culture/rev o lu tion, etc., can be properly accommodated within the 
logocentric frame work.
Logocentrism is able to reinterpret reality and truth because when it 
takes the form of symbolic capital (logo), it is capable of turning real-
ity upside-down. But the question is: how long can symbolic capital 
last without the injection of adequate economic capital? Did Mao's di-
 lem ma lie between the political necessities of 'uninterrupted revolution' 
on the one hand and economic rationality of capital accumulation on 
the oth er? When symbolic capital (logocentrism) is applied to enlarge 
economic capital (the Cultural Revolution, mass-line approach to in-
 dus tri al i za tion), its principles (discourses) have to face some systematic 
realignments between needs, desires, preferences, and interests other 
than symbolic and moral elements. This can also be explained by Gram-
sci's (1971) two aspects of an individual's common sense (worldview), 
which consists of a variety of elements, some of which may contradict 
the dominant ideology.
Although the Dengist market reform is no doubt based on econocen-
trism, it has also shrewdly 'borrowed' the strength of logocentric capital 
in order to legitimize reform policies theoretically. However, if logocen-
trism is believed to be vulnerable to the advances of econocentrism, 
so too is the latter vulnerable to the resurgence of capitalist diseases, 
namely social inequality, moral decay, class po lar i za tion, unemploy-
ment, etc. The dilemma for econocentrism is that it tends to generate 
societal contradictions for the revival of a logocentric movement. The 
'Min Zhu Qiang' (Democracy Wall) movement at the end of the 1970s14
– and especially the student demonstrations in 1989, together with the 
support it received from citizens who protested against the new social 
inequities and offi cial corruption – testifi ed to a great deal of spirit and 
courage inherited from the Cultural Revolution (Li 2001). The persistent 
popularity of Mao, almost three decades after his death, is not just a mat-
ter of historical nostalgia but a durable sym bol of justice and equality.15
It is believed that China's future development, whether political, 
eco nom ic or cultural, will inevitably in one way or another link back to 
some facets of Mao's historical legacy and his logocentrism. The pros-
 pects for Chinese socialism, if we believe there will be any, will surely 
not evolve from the existing socio-political establishment. Rather, it 
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will probably emerge from strong popular responses and resistances 
among the 'new' classes of exploited populations to the deterioration 
of po lit i cal and social welfare conditions, and from a series of struggles 
against the distortions and consequences generated by China's proto-
capitalist practices. 
Li Xing is Assistant Professor, Research Center on Development and International 
Relations, Aalborg University, Denmark.
NOTES
1   They include yang wu yun dong (modernization movement) after the Sino-British 
Opi um War (1840-1842), wu xu bian fa (the imperial institutional reform movement 
of 1898), and the 1911 Revolution under Sun Yat-sen.
2   Source: The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language. Fourth Edition. 
3    See Derrida (1973, 1976, 1978).
4 The Chinese Revolution here includes both the period of the armed revolution (1921-
49) and the period of the uninterrupted revolution/ Chinese socialism (1949-77).
5 Friedrich Hegel, drawing a comparison with Western consciousness of the world 
that cre at ed revolutionary history, placed China in the 'childhood' of history. Even 
Karl Marx, whose theories and insights inspired the Chinese Revolution, described 
China as a society 'veg e tat ing in the teeth of time', and discovered in the Great Wall 
of China a metaphor for the universal resistance of non-European societies to change 
(quoted from Dirlik and Meisner 1989: 17). Max Weber [1904] (1976) also considered 
Chinese culture (Confucianism) and social pat terns (family relations) as structural 
barriers to the rise of capitalism. 
6 'China', in Chinese Zhongguo (the middle kingdom) means that the country lies in-
be tween the heaven (God) and the earth (globe), which symbolizes the self-perception 
of being at the centre of the world civilizations.
7 This is part of Mao's understanding of power in which ignorance and illiteracy can 
be a source of power. In his own words, any beautiful picture can be drawn on a 
blank sheet of paper.
8 This idiomatic repression means that the implementation of new reform policies 
should be carried out with great caution, i.e. on a trial basis.
9 The view that China was in 'the primary stage of socialism' was fi rst articulated by 
the then Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang at the 13th National Party Congress 
of the Com mu nist Party of China in 1987. Although he was removed from the Party 
in the af ter math of the 1989 student unrest, the CCP still adheres to his line of argu-
ment of promoting the growth of the productive forces.
10 During the war period, the 'united front' strategy of reducing and simplifying the 
com plex i ty of politics to an issue of class relations aimed to mobilize political action 
and raise popular awareness. The question today is whether such complexity could 
be encompassed in this simplifi ed manner in post-revolutionary society.
11 During the Cultural Revolution, 'red' implied political and class consciousness 
where as 'ex per tise' referred to knowledge, expertise, and technology. It was impor-
tant that peo ple with technical expertise must fi rst and foremost adopt correct political 
and class at ti tude. In other words, 'red' and 'expertise' must be combined, but with 
the emphasis on the former.
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12 Guanxi in Chinese means 'relations' or 'relationship'. It implies that in dealing with social, 
business and personal relations, the 'human' or the non-economic aspects of these relations 
(i.e. friends and family) are placed above economic calculations in im por tance. 
13 For further information on China's private ownership and employment, see Sun 
Sheng Han and Pannell (1999). 
14 During the winter months of 1978-79, some people posted written protests about the 
prob lems of China on a blank stretch of wall on Beijing's Changan Avenue calling 
for political reforms and democracy. This became known as 'Democracy Wall'. One 
of the key fi gures behind this movement was Wei Jingshen, a political dissident who 
now lives in exile abroad.
15     China marked the 110th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth in December 2003 with 
a rap song, new books, new memoirs and praise for the communist founder. The 
Central Com mit tee of CPC also held a seminar at the Great Hall of the People to 
mark the event with the Party Secretary Hu Jintao delivering a speech prais ing Mao's 
his tor i cal role and contributions.
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